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Military Justice: The Oxymoron of the 1980's
MICHAEL I. SPAK*

"The great thing in this world is not so much where we stand as
in which direction we are moving[.]"'
INTRODUCTION

Over fourteen years ago, precedent was broken like shattering
crystal. The United States Supreme Court handed down the
landmark decision of O'Callahanv. Parker,2 and with it, the abrupt demise of unlimited subject matter jurisdiction over military
personnel? The previous eighty-four years had provided little
constitutional protection for service personnel, since military status alone brought the accused before the exclusive jurisdiction of
the courts-martial. 4 O'Callahan recognized the dangers of this

narrow basis for jurisdiction and added the requirement that the
accused's action must also have a "service connection." 5 The days
of unlimited subject 6matter jurisdiction over military personnel
appeared to be over.
Unfortunately, the service connection requirement was to pro-

tect the constitutional rights of military personnel for only the
next eleven years. On October 14, 1980, the United States Court

of Military Appeals (COMA) in UnitedStates v. ro/tier7 emascu-

* Professor of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago-Kent College of
Law. The author acknowledges the highly original contributions of Jeffrey Stewart
Shapiro, and the research assistance of John Baldridge, David Berry and Bruce Alan
Meyer, all of whom are law students at Illinois Institute of Technology.
I. O.W. HOLMES, THE AUTOCRAT OF THE BREAKFAST TABLE ch. 4 (1858).
2. 395 U.S. 258 (1969). See also, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10
U.S.C. 802 (1983), which was in existence at the time O'Callahan placed military personnel within the jurisdiction of the courts-martial based only on military status.
3. O'Callahan,395 U.S. at 267; see also Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 241
(1960).
4. See infra notes 27-47 and accompanying text.
5. O'Callahan,395 U.S. at 273, 274. The Court noted that although the petitioner was a United States Army Sergeant and had assaulted a young girl and attempted rape, a) he was absent from his military base; b) the crimes were not
committed on a military post or enclave; and c) the victim was not, in any way, performing any duties relating to the military. Furthermore, the crimes were d) not committed with authority stemming from war power, e) they were committed within
United States territorial limits; f) did not involve any question of flouting military
authorty; nor g) impair the security of a military post, or the integrity of military
property.
6. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
7. 9 M.J. 337 (C.M.A. 1980). COMA held that almost any case concerning
drugs was automatically service connected.
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lated the service connection requirement,8 thereby condemning a
new generation of American military personnel to the savage and
capricious nature of military law. Court-martial jurisdiction centered once again on a strict interpretation of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ), which was established prior to the
O'Callahan decision, and its single requirement-the accused's
military status. 9
During the eleven year reign of O'Callahan,a further move was
made to protect the right of military personnel, this time in the
area of military recruitment. In the 1975 case of United States v.
Russo,10 COMA ruled that there was no court-martial jurisdiction
over the accused (a recruit), where the recruiter involved had acted deviously and fraudulently." The court held that it was important to protect, "applicants who do not meet specified mental,
physical, and moral standards for enlistment. . .[from an] environment [in] which they may be incapable of functioning effectively."' 2 The courts seemed to be headed in the right direction,
but just as the service connection requirement was overruled in
1980, the Congress of the United States responded by making it
13
possible for a recruit to be subject to court-martial jurisdiction
regardless of how duplicitously
the recruiter had acted during the
4
time of recruitment.'
It is obvious that since 1980 we have been moving in the wrong
direction. With all due respect to Mr. Justice Holmes, it appears
that in the context of court-martial jurisdiction, the real danger
lies not only in the direction, but also with the present extent of
our movement. Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ) military personnel are denied the right to grand jury indictment,' 5 trial by impartial jury, 16 and bail. In addition, military
personnel are denied the right to independent counsel. 17 There is
no doubt that military personnel enjoy less constitutional rights
8. Id at 350.
9. 10 U.S.C. 802 (1983). This section simply enumerates the various types of
military positions or posts as sufficient to establish jurisdiction.
10. 1 M.J. 134 (C.M.A. 1975).
11. Id.at 137.
12. Id. at 136.
13. 10 U.S.C. § 802(b)(c) (1980). The amendment was part of the FY 1980 Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-107, title VIII, § 801 (a)(1)(2), 93 Stat. 810
(1979).
14. 10 U.S.C. § 802(b)(c) (1980). See Schlueter, Court-MartialJurisdiction: An
Expansion of the Least Possible Power,73 J. CRiM. L. Rav. 74, 83 (1982).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
16. 10 U.S.C. § 825 (1968). The convening authority selects the officers, by
name, who will adjudge guilt or innocence (set forth).
17. Henry v. Middendorf, 425 U.S. 25, 29 (1976). During the summary courtmartial proceeding no counsel need be given.
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than their civilian counterparts. 18 It is this author's aim to extend
all of the constitutional rights traditionally enjoyed by United
States citizens to military personnel absent compelling justification. Therefore, it is contended that court-martial jurisdiction
should be limited to those statutory offenses that require military
status and therefore should apply exclusively to members of the
armed forces. 19 In sum, it is the author's thesis that military justice is the oxymoron of the 1980's. To explore this premise, this
Article will closely examine three major areas of military law:
personal jurisdiction,20 subject matter jurisdiction, 21 and procedural military justice.22 Each of these three areas will be examined from a historic perspective, viewing present developments
with an eye toward projected or proposed change. Finally, by
means of contrast, the military justice systems of France and Germany will be considered briefly to show how other democratic
countries23 have reacted to their entrance into the twentieth
century.
I.

PERSONAL JURISDICTION

The first of the three areas of military law to be examined is
personal jurisdiction. Courts-martial have personal jurisdiction
over an accused when the accused has obtained some form of military status. 24 For example, military courts have no power to try
civilians including those who accompany military personnel. 25 To
complete this analysis, this section will focus on one of the most
litigated aspects of personal jurisdiction, the inception of military
status. It is this area of military law which supplies one of the
18. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140
(1952); In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 153 (1890). Under military jurisdiction constitutional right of freedom of speech, no excessive bail, counsel, indictment, may be legally denied.
19. United States v. McDonagh, 14 M.J. 415, 423 (C.M.A. 1983); United States v.
Marsh, 15 M.J. 252, 254 (C.M.A. 1983). According to COMA's standard the following offenses should be considered "peculiarly military." Desertion, 10 U.S.C. § 885
(1956); Absence Without Leave; 10 U.S.C. § 886 (1956); Contempt towards officers 10
U.S.C. § 888 (1956); Insubordinate conduct toward warrant officer, noncommissioned
officer, or petty officer, 10 U.S.C. § 891 (1956); Misbehavior before the enemy; 10
U.S.C. § 899 (1956); Misbehavior of sentinel; 10 U.S.C. § 913 (1956); 10 U.S.C. 933;
Conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman; 10 U.S.C. 934 (1956).
20. See infra notes 24-86 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 87-130 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 131-62 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 163-75 and accompanying text.
24. Seegenerall, Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1956); Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11
(1955).
25. See e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1959); Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11
(1955). See generaly, Giovagnoni, JurisdictionMinus a Unform, 14 AF JAG L. REV.
190 (1973).
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most powerful arguments for limiting the jurisdiction of military
courts. Here it will be noted that military status will be found,
regardless of any fraud or coercion perpetrated by the recruiter
against the accused. 26 By necessity, the oscillating expanse of personal jurisdiction over the past ninety-three years will be explored
since it is only through this historic viewpoint that the present nature of the recruitment process can be understood.
A.

Inception of PersonalJurisdiction: 1890-1974

Throughout the history of personal jurisdiction there has been
one scenario that has steadfastly provoked litigation. The scenario begins with a person who enlists in the military. That individual subsequently commits an offense proscribed by the Uniform
Code of Military Justice and the enlistee is ultimately court-martialed. However, during the court-martial proceedings the accused argues that the court possesses no jurisdiction because his
to meet one or more of the
enlistment is void due to his failure
27
standards established by Congress.
This scenario was resolved during the 1890-1974 era through
two rationales, both adopted in the year 1890. The first rationale
made its debut in the case of In re Grimle, 28 In In re Grimley, an
enlistee was court-martialed after being adjudged a deserter. During the proceedings, Grimley argued that he could not be courtmartialed because the court did not have personal jurisdiction
over him. His theory was that, since he was above the maximum
legal age when he enlisted, his enlistment was fraudulent and void
ab initio. The Supreme Court disagreed and ruled that personal
jurisdiction existed. The High Court held that in order for Grimley's enlistment to be valid, thereby changing his status from civilian to soldier, two things had to exist: The enlistment contract
had to: 1) be entered into voluntarily; and 2) be entered into by an
individual who was competent to do so.29 Grimley met both of
these requirements. The Supreme Court and many courts took
this approach regarding enlistment because they were afraid that
26. United States v. Buckingham, 11 M.J. 184 (C.M.A. 1981).
The deliberate violation of service regulations in and of itself did not void
an enlistment contract for jurisdictional purposes under the Russo decision
. . . Accordingly, even assuming the recruiter, in contravention of service
regulations, advised the appellant not to list his involvement [in previous
criminal offenses], this alone would not defeat court-martial jurisdiction.
Id at 186.
27. AR No. 601-210 Chap. 2 (15 Jan. 1975) sets forth the different standards that
must be met before enlistment will be allowed. These include citizenship, trainability,
educational, physical, moral, and age requirements.
28. 137 U.S. 147 (1890).
29. Id. at 151.
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if people like Grimley were able to invoke enlistment defects to
void their enlistments and destroy personal jurisdiction, then there
would be little to stop wholesale desertion by these soldiers during
battle.30 The court also observed that it might have ruled differently, had it felt that Grimley's enlistment had been undertaken
while he was under "duress, ignorance, intoxication, or any other
disability which by its nature, disabled him from changing his status or entering into new relations." 31
The second rationale which provided a basis for validating an
otherwise improper or void recruitment was called "constructive
enlistment, ' 32 and it was seen as nothing more than an implied
contract.3 3 A defective enlistment was transformed into a valid
enlistment if the soldier voluntarily performed his military duties,
and had received his salary and benefits from the military. 34 The
reasoning was that a defective enlistment did not confer military
status, but that the defective enlistment ripened into a valid enlistment, once the enlistee manifested his interest to change his status. 35 This manifestation of intent occurred when the enlistee
carried out his duties voluntarily and the enlistee accepted his pay
and benefits from the military. In other words, though an individual's formal attempt to change his status had failed, his status
would nevertheless be changed by the implied contract that had
subsequently been formed. 36
The use of these two rationales to invoke military status should
not be understood to mean that individuals who enlisted while
below the minimum legal age would beforced to stay in the military. Minors under the minimum enlistment age were not considered competent to make enlistment contracts. 37 Therefore their
enlistments were void.3 8 For those minors who had enlisted with
the consent of a parent or guardian, regaining civilian status was a
bit more difficult. The child's guardian or parent had the right "to
30. See, e.g., In re McVey, 23 F. 878, 880 (D. Cal. 1885). Insane individuals are
incompetent to enlist, therefore their enlistment is void ab initio AR 635-200. Persons
who are intoxicated, have been convicted of a felony, or are aliens not admitted for
permanent residency are also disqualified from enlisting. However, the enlistment of
these individuals is voidable rather than void. AR 635-300.
31. Grimley, 137 U.S. at 151-3.
32. United States v. Overton, 9 C.M.A. 684, 688, 26 C.M.R. 464, 468 (1958);
United States v. Johnson, 6 C.M.A. 320, 20 C.M.R. 36 (1956).
33. Unites States v. Overton, 9 C.M.A. 684, 688, 26 C.M.R. 464, 468 (1958);
United Sates v. Fant, 25 C.M.R. 643 (1957).
34. United States v. Fant, 25 C.M.R. 643, 645-47 (1957).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. In re Morrissey, 137 U.S. 157, 159 (1890); United States v. Graham 22
C.M.A. 75, 46 C.M.R. 75 (1972); United States v. Blanton, 7 C.M.A. 664, 23 C.M.R.
128 (1957).
38. Morrissey, 137 U.S. at 159.
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invoke the aid of the court, and secure the restoration of a minor

to his or her control.

. .

,,39

but, the child had no right to under-

take this action for himself.40 By contrast, the fraudulent enlistment of a seventeen year old minor today, who subsequently
passes the statutory minimum enlistment age of eighteen, is considered valid through the doctrine of constructive enlistment.
This is based on two alternative assumptions: (1) there has been
no protestation from the minor, and he has accepted his pay; or
(2) a parent or guardian (that had not consented to his enlistment)
has not requested the enlistee's release within ninety days after
enlistment. 4' The minor retains military status, and the military
courts retain personal jurisdiction only so long as neither alternative assumption occurs. 42 Finally, there is absolutely no jurisdic43
tion over a child sixteen years old or younger.
4
In United States v. Fant a typical example of a constructive
enlistment occurred, where a sixteen year old enlisted by fraudulently representing himself as an eighteen year old. When he was
seventeen years old, his mother sent a letter to the Adjutant General of the army telling him of the fraud. After the letter was received the minor committed a court-martial offense. The issue
was: Did the mother's letter void personal jurisdiction? The
Court ruled that it had personal jurisdiction,45 holding that a constructive enlistment existed since Fant had submitted to military
authority, performed his military duties, had received his pay, and
reached an age (seventeen) when the army could legally accept his
services. 46 Today, this same result would occur, but only if Fant
had enlisted at age seventeen. 47
B. Inception of PersonalJurisdiction: 1974-1980
The second era of personal jurisdiction was ushered in by
United States v. Catlow.48 Calow was the forerunner of three
cases where COMA began to limit jurisdiction over military per39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 10 U.S.C. § 1170 (1970); AR 635-200, para. 7-5; cf In re Morrissey, 137 U.S.
157, 159 (1890).
42. United States v. Graham, 22 C.M.A. 75, 95 C.M.R. 75 (1972); United States
v. Bean, 13 C.M.A. 203, 32 C.M.R. 203 (1962).
43. United States v. Graham, 22 C.M.A. 75, 76, 46 C.M.R. 75, 76 (1972); United
States v. Blanton, 7 C.M.A. 664 at 667, 23 C.M.R. 128, 131 (1957); AR No. 613-200
Chap. 7 (Aug. 17, 1975): Where a minimum age is stated by a regulation implementing a statute, it is a minimum age "prescribed by law."
44. 25 C.M.R. 643 (1958).
45. Id. at 647.
46. Id.
47. United States v. Brown, 23 C.M.A. 162, 48 C.M.R. 778 (1974).
48. 23 C.M.A. 142, 48 C.M.R. 758 (1974).
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sonnel with defective enlistments. The process was completed in
United States v. Brown,4 9 and United States v. Russo.50 During
this process COMA looked back to In re Grimlej' and the related
law regarding constructive enlistment. It is interesting to note that
in all three cases, some form of recruiter misconduct gave rise to
the cause of action.
The limitations of personal jurisdiction represented by these
leading cases can be divided into three categories: duress, underage enlistment, and recruiter misconduct. When taken as a whole,
these three categories provide a clear basis to limit personal jurisdiction, however, each category provides its own motivation for
limiting personal jurisdiction.
1. Duress.-In Catlow, the accused had been charged, before
enlistment, with loitering, resisting arrest, carrying a concealed
weapon, and assault. The judge gave Thomas Catlow a choice
between trial on the charges which carried a maximum possible
sentence of five years, or enlistment in the army. Catlow, who
was seventeen years old at the time, obtained his mother's consent
and enlisted. Eight days after enlistment the charges against him
were dropped.5 2 Thomas Catlow's commitment to army life was
soon evident; he committed several offenses in an attempt to compel a discharge and finally succeeded; he was soon court-martialed. Catlow argued that he could not be tried by the court of
military review because there was no personal jurisdiction. His
position was that the recruiter who recruited him had failed to
follow army regulations which absolutely disqualified for enlistment5 3 any individual who had criminal charges pending against
him.

The court of military review held that the regulation regarding
disqualification was solely for the benefit of the army and that
jurisdiction existed because the army had the absolute right to
waive that benefit. On appeal, however, COMA overturned
Catlow's conviction, ruling that no jurisdiction existed. The court
enumerated three reasons for its decision. First, because of the
harsh nature of the military status, and the lack of facilities for
rehabilitation, the prohibition in the code was also for the equal
49. 23 C.M.A. 162, 48 C.M.R. 778.
50. 1 M.J. 134 (C.M.A. 1975).
51. 137 U.S. 147 (1890).
52. Catlow, 23 C.M.A. at 143, 48 C.M.R. at 759.
53. AR 601-210 para. 2-12, n.2 (May 1, 1968). In its opinion the court of military
review ruled that this regulation could be waived, by authority granted by another
regulation AR 635-200, para. 3-5(b)(2) (July 11, 1966). The regulation allows the
army to retain disqualified individuals.
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benefit of Catlow.5 4 Second, borrowing from In re Grimley,55
COMA concluded that Catlow did not voluntarily enlist in the
56
military because he was under the duress of a possible jail term.
Finally, COMA's decision rested on the theory of constructive enlistment. The Court ruled that no constructive enlistment had occurred because the two part test for constructive enlistment had
not been met. While it was true that Catlow received his pay and
benefits from the army, Thomas Catlow had never voluntarily
carried out his work. COMA ruled that Catlow's acts of misconduct were actually acts of protest against his continued military
service.5 7 In light of the above, Catlow's enlistment was void ab
initio and the door was opened to further scrutiny regarding recruitment abuses.
2 UnderageEnlistment.-In UnitedStates v. Brown,58 COMA
limited personal jurisdiction in a second area-underage enlistment. In Brown, the recruiter failed to discover that the accused
forged his father's signature to the consent form by failing to comply with the regulation requiring the recruiter to either witness the
signature or that the signature be notarized. Brown claimed that
he had informed his commanding officers at two different military
bases of the circumstances of his enlistment, and that no steps
were taken to investigate his claim.
COMA found that the recruiter's failure to comply with regulations, and the commanding officer's failure to investigate the
claim estopped the government from relying on the concept of
constructive enlistment.5 9 The government had a duty to act with
60
reasonable speed to investigate a possible fraudulent enlistment.
In addition, the court changed the law of constructive enlistment
as it applied to persons under seventeen years of age, indicating
that even if an accused should reach age seventeen during the
time the investigation was taking place, the government would be
barred from relying on constructive enlistment to provide jurisdiction.6 1 In the court's language, "[Tihe proscription of the law is
that there should not be sixteen year old persons in the army. The
age barrier is not to be negotiated by the wishes of the enlistee or
his superiors. '62 COMA ruled that since underage enlistments
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

United States v. Catlow, 23 C.M.A. 142, 145, 48 C.M.R. 758, 761 (1974).
137 U.S. 147 (1890).
Catlow, 23 C.M.A. 142 at 145, 48 C.M.R. 758 at 761.
Id. at 146, 48 C.M.R. at 762.
23 C.M.A. 162, 165, 48 C.M.R. 778, 781 (1974).
Id. at 165, 48 C.M.R. at 781.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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were void, they could never serve as the basis of a constructive
enlistment. This rationale provided a severe limitation on the military jurisdiction of the previous era where such an enlistment
could evolve into a constructive enlistment once the enlistee
reached seventeen years of age. This new protection was extended
to underage personnel because of the public policy that children
63
must be protected from themselves and overzealous recruiters.
Brown had ruled that an enlistment would be voided if a recruiter
'64 This
failed to follow "proper and lawful recruiting practices.
65
Russo.
v.
States
United
of
was to be a foreshadowing
3. Recruiter Misconduct.-While the last area of change as
memorialized by United States v. Russo, occurred in a recruiter
misconduct case, its impact also reverberated throughout the
realm of personal jurisdiction.
Russo suffered from dyslexia. This condition severely impaired
his reading ability so when he enlisted, the recruiter gave him the
answers to the qualifying test. Russo was later court-martialed,
but he claimed that the court had no jurisdiction because of recruiter misconduct. The army claimed that Russo lacked standing
to challenge the army's failure to abide by the regulation requiring
that a minimum mental aptitude be shown before admission in
the army. The army said that the regulation was solely for the
protection and benefit of the armed services. COMA disagreed
and ruled that there was no jurisdiction because of basic contract
law principles and the public policy of "fair play." 66 The court
held, "because fraudulent enlistments are not in the public interest, we believe that common law contract principles appropriately
dictate that where recruiter misconduct amounts to a violation of
the fraudulent enlistment statute,67 as was the situation here, the
'68
resulting enlistment is void as contrary to public policy."
There were two parts to this fairness argument. First, COMA
found that just as in Cat/ow, the army regulation was also for the
benefit of individuals. The regulation requiring minimum test
scores protected "applicants who [did] not meet specified mental,
physical, and moral standards for enlistment by barring their ac63. Id.
64. Id
65. 1 M.J. 134 (C.M.A. 1975).
66. Id at 137.
67. 10 U.S.C. § 884 (1956). Unlawful enlistment, appointment, or separation.
Any person subject to this chapter who effects an enlistment or appointment in or a
separation from the armed forces of any person who is known to him to be ineligible
for that enlistment, appointment, or separation because it is prohibited by law, regulation, or order shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
68. United States v. Russo, I M.J. 134, 136 (1975).
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cess to an environment in which they may be incapable of functioning effectively. . it is the recruit who is ultimately protected
...from himself ....*"69 Secondly, COMA did not permit the
application of a constructive enlistment. "Fairness prevents the
government from relying upon a constructive enlistment as a jurisdictional base where government agents acted improperly in securing an individual's enlistment." 70 Thus, no change of status
resulted.
Subsequently, the Court narrowed, and Congress limited, the
results of the Catlow-Russo-Brown trilogy. First, the rule barring
the enlistment of an individual, where recruiter misconduct was
present, was narrowed; only recruiter actions that were intentional
or grossly negligent voided an enlistment. 71 Secondly, even if a
recruit fraudulently entered the armed forces, his enlistment was
if the recruiter or the governvoidable but not necessarily void,
72
ment was unaware of the fraud.
C

JurisdictionExpansion by CongressionalAmendment: 1980
to Present

The Congressional response to the judicial restriction of personal jurisdiction during the previous era was the following
amendment to Article 2 of the UCMJ:
(b) The voluntary enlistment of any person who has the capacity to understand the significance of enlisting in the armed
forces shall be valid for purposes ofjurisdication under subsection (a) of this section and a change of status from civilian to
member of the armed forces shall be effective upon the taking
to the oath of enlistment.
(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person serving with an armed force who(1) submitted voluntarily to military authority;
(2) met the mental competency and minimum age qualifications of sections 504 and 505 of this title at the time of voluntary submission to military authority;
(3) received military pay or allowances; and
(4) performed military duties;
is subject to this chapter until such person's active service has
been terminated in accordance with law or regulations promul69. Id.
70. Id.
71. United States v. Valadez, 5 M.J. 470, 474-75 (C.M.A. 1978). Constructive
enlistment was allowed only if mere negligence was shown.
72. United States v. Wagner, 5 M.J. 461, 466-68 (C.M.A. 1978); United States v.
Lightfoot, 4 M.J. 262, 263 n.3 (C.M.A. 1978). If recruiters, in good faith, based on
information provided them, assumed that enlistee was qualified, public policy dictated that enlistment not be voided.
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gated by the Secretary concerned. 73
In essence, Congress had reinstituted the law as it had stood seven
years earlier in the 1890-1974 era. To determine whether military
status existed, subsection (b) used criteria first enunciated in In re
Grimley.74 A valid enlistment requires a voluntary undertaking by
a competent individual. Subsection (c) resurrected the doctrine of
constructive enlistment.
Conspicuously absent from the amendment is any mention of
the effect of recruiter misconduct during enlistment. It appears
that recruiter misconduct is now a neutral factor in a determination of whether an enlistment is valid and personal jurisdiction
exists.75 This fact is particularly distressing since recruiter misconduct is a pervasive and growing problem as evidenced in testimony given by former Marine Corps recruiters to a Senate Armed
Services Subcommittee in October, 1978:
Former Sergeant Donald Robinette described how recruiters in
northern Ohio falsified high school diplomas and police
records to meet the demands for recruits from his commander,
Major Klaus Schreiber, who considers himself "the best recruiting officer in the Marine Corps." Said Robinette: "The pressure never stopped. We were'76doing everything to get the bodies
and they still wanted more."
At one point, Schreiber threatened to break a recruiter's arm if he
failed to meet his quota. Schreiber told the committee that the
threat was not serious. Said he: "We're in the Marine Corps.
That's the way we speak. We're not graduates of the College of
the Immaculate Conception." With considerable pride Schreiber
reported that he managed to raise his staffs performance from
59% of its quota to 100% after he took charge in 1977. His reward:
headquarters increased his quota by thirteen percentage points.
To meet such demands, ex-recruiters and Marine lawyers across
the country testified that recruiters have gone to such lengths as
enlisting a violence-prone youth from a juvenile home and even
signing-up a fictitious candidate. To qualify a youth with a long
police record, a recruiter would drop the first letter of the candidate's name so the police check would turn up no trace of criminal
activity. Schreiber told recruiters to ask Marine hopefuls leading
questions such as, "You haven't smoked marijuana, have you?"
Answers, of course, were negative. Some recruiters coach candi73. Pub. L. No. 96-107 title, VIII §§ 801(A)(1)(7), 93 Stat. 810 (1979); (FY 1980
Defense Authorization Act).
74. 137 U.S. 147 (1890).
75. Schlueter, Court Martial Jurisdictiom An Expansion of the Least Possible
Power, 73 J. CRIM. L. 75, 83 (1982).
76. Time, October 23, 1978, at 35.
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dates in advance to ensure that they pass aptitude tests, or use
bright stand-ins for those who seem sure to fail. Robinette said
that one ringer in northern Ohio had taken the test for fifteen candidates and was so proficient that he could deliver any score
77
needed.
The pervasiveness of recruiter misconduct offers a major reason
why personal jurisdiction should be restricted and should prevent
improper enlistments from becoming valid through the doctrine of
constructive enlistment.
By analogy, the rationales providing the philosophical underpinnings which support the exclusionary rule can also be utilized
in analyzing improper attachment of military jurisdiction. In
Mapp v. Ohio7 8 the United States Supreme Court held that illegally obtained evidence could not be used against an accused
since there is no benefit in having a constitutional amendment
against illegal searches and seizures if police can still use the illegally obtained evidence. 79 The court stated:
[I]n extending the substantive protections of due process to all
constitutionally unreasonable searches-state or federal-it
was . .. necessary that the exclusion doctrine-an essential
part of the right of privacy-be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf case.
In short, the admission of the new constitutional right by Wolf
could not consistently tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence
which an accused has been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the
80 right but in
reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment.
Just as the court in Mapp v. Ohio recognized that using evidence
obtained by improper and illegal means negated the very right
created, so too are protective recruitment standards circumvented
when illegal and improper means are used. Both instances ultimately end in the accused being improperly tried. In the first instance there is a denial of fourth amendment rights, while in the
second a lack of proper personal jurisdiction and consequently a
denial of the constitutional right to due process. By means of example, various disqualifications against entering the military exist
8
to protect potential enlistees. As noted in UnitedStates v. Russo, '
by Judge Fletcher:
The various enlistment disqualifications evidence not only a
desire to assure an effective fighting force for the country but
77. Time, October 23, 1978, at 35.

78. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
79. Id. at 656.
80. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-56 (1961).
81. 1 M.J. 134 (C.M.A. 1975).
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also a commendable attempt to minimize future administrative
and disciplinary difficulties with recruits by qualitatively reducing the class of eligible enlistees. The latter objective is not
solely for the benefit of the armed services. It is also a means of
protecting applicants who do not meet specified mental, physical, and moral standards for enlistment by barring their access
to an environment in which they may be incapable of functioning effectively. .

.

. The result we reach will have the salutary

effect of encouraging recruiters to observe recruiting regulain their drive to elimtions while also assisting the armed forces
82
inate fraudulent recruiting practices.
If fraudulent enlistments are allowed to become valid through
the doctrine of constructive enlistment, then these statutory protections are of little value to an enlistee. Just as the exclusionary
rule was developed to protect the Fourth Amendment right
against illegal searches and seizures, so too must recruiter misconduct render fraudulent enlistment void ab initio. There is no
other way to protect individuals who cannot possibly succeed in a
military environment.
The second rationale offered as a basis for the exclusionary rule
enunciated in Mafpp is its deterent affect on illegal police conduct.8 3 "Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule 'is to deter-to compel respect for
the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available wayby removing the incentive to disregard it.' ",84
Brown v. Illinois 5 offers an interesting analogy to the issue of
deterring recruiter misconduct. Brown was arrested without probable cause and without a warrant. He was given his Miranda
rights while he was in custody. Thereafter, while in custody he
made incriminating statements, which were later used to convict
him. The Supreme Court reversed his conviction saying:
If Miranda warnings, by themselves, were held to attenuate the
taint of an unconstitutional arrest, regardless of how wanton
and purposeful the Fourth Amendment violation, the effect of
the exclusionary rule would be substantially diluted. .

.

. Ar-

rests made without warrant or without probable cause, for
questioning or "investigation," would be encouraged by the
knowledge that evidence derived therefrom could well be made
admissible8 6at trial by the simple expedient of giving Miranda
warnings.
Today, recruiters know that for a fraudulent enlistment to become binding, a recruit needs only to take his pay and perform his
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id at 136.
367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
Id
422 U.S. 590 (1975).
Id at 602.
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duties.8 7 Since recruiter misconduct is now a neutral factor in the
determination of whether a valid enlistment exists, there is nothing to deter a recruiter from acting improperly and enlisting unqualified recruits. The recruiter knows that once a recruit takes
his first pay and performs his duties, the taint of an illegal enlistment will be "attenuated." In sum, for the protection of the individual's constitutional rights, and for the deterrence of
government misconduct, any illegal recruiter conduct should
cause an enlistment to be void ab initio.
II.

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

If you cry "Forward" you must be sure to make clear the direction in which to go. Don't you see that if you fail to do that and
a revolutionary they
simply call out the words to a monk and
88
will go in precisely opposite directions.
During the past 200 years there has been much debate on courtmartial jurisdiction and during the last fifteen years, subject matter jurisdiction has been at the forefront of this debate. In 1969,
the Supreme Court held that one way to improve the military justice system was to rule that no jurisdiction existed over a soldier
who committed a rape while he was off duty, off base, and out of
uniform.8 9 The Supreme Court stated that in order to assure military personnel of the maximum amount of constitutional protection, they could only90be tried in the military if their offense was
"service connected." However, in apparent contradiction to this
new standard, COMA ruled in 1980 that the one way to improve
87. 10 U.S.C. § 802(b)(c) (1979).
88. Quote attributed to Anton Chekhow, J. GARDNER, KNOW OR LISTEN TO
THOSE WHO KNOW (1975).

89. We have concluded that [for a] crime to be under military jurisdiction it
must be service connected, lest cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in
the militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger as used in
the Fifth Amendment, be expanded to deprive every member of the armed
services of the benefits of an indictment by a grand jury and a trial by a jury
of his peers. The power of Congress to make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces, art. I, § 8, cl. 14, need not be sparingly read in order to preserve those two important constitutional guarantees. For it is assumed that an express grant of general power to Congress is
to be exercised in harmony with express guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
We were advised on oral argument that Art. 134 is construed by the military
to give it power to try a member of the armed services for income tax evasion. This article has been called "a catchall" that "incorporated almost
every Federal penal statute into the Uniform Code."
R. EVERETT, MILITARY JUSTICE IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES 6869 (1956). "The catalogue of cases put within reach of the military is indeed long; and
we see no way of saving to servicemen and servicewomen in any case the benefits of
indictment and of trial by jury, if we conclude that this petitioner was properly tried
by court-martial." O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 273 (1969).
90. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 273 (1969).
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the military justice system was to provide for court-martial jurisdiction over drug offenses committed off base by military personnel even though off duty and out of uniform. 9 '
While there is no doubt that the sale and use of illegal drugs is a
scourge that plagues all of society, this does not provide an ample
excuse to take away from service personnel the constitutionally
protected rights which other United States citizens enjoy. To insure that military personnel receive the full benefit of all of the
constitutional protections as often as possible, military subject
92
matter jurisdiction must be restricted to purely military offense.
To support this contention an analysis of subject matter jurisdiction during the past fifteen years will be undertaken.
A.

The Development of the Service Connection Requirement
During the FirstEleven Years

Prior to 1969, subject matter jurisdiction was unlimited. 93 All
that was required for a finding of subject matter jurisdiction was
that the accused be in the military, and the offense be set out in
the UCMJ.

94

In 1969, the Supreme Court modified subject matter jurisdiction. 95 Suspicious of military justice, subject matter jurisdiction of
courts-martials was limited to those offenses that were "service
connected." "[C]ourts-martial as an institution are singularly in'96
ept in dealing with the nice subtleties of constitutional law."
However, no mention was made at that time of what constituted a
service connected offense. Two years later in Relford v. Commandant,97 the Supreme Court went to great effort to define the
requirement.
Relford was court-martialed for kidnapping and raping two women on a military reservation. The Supreme Court ruled that the
offense was "service connected." In doing so, the Court delineated twenty-one factors to be considered in determining whether
91. United States v. Trottier, 9 M.J. 337 (C.M.A. 1980). "Such conduct is inimical to a fit and ready armed force; and it is, under those circumstances, appropriately
subject to prosecution and punishment by the military." Id. at 353.
92. This would not be such a drastic step since many legal scholars agree that
O'Callahanwas designed to limit military jurisdiction to only those cases where jurisdiction is required by military exigencies. See generally Note, Military Jurisdiction
Over Crimes Committed by MilitaryPersonnelOutside the United States: The Effect of
O'Callahan v. Parker, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1016 (1970). See generally Jurisdiction of
Military Courts Service-Connected Crimes, 37 TENN. L. REV. 421 (1970).
93. Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
94. Id. at 241.
95. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
96. Id at 265.
97. 401 U.S. 355 (1971).
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an offense was "service connected. '98 The presence of the first
twelve factors in a case would indicate that an offense was not
service connected. The last nine factors were additional consider-

ations in determining the presence of a "service connection."
The Supreme Court in Refford determined that court-martial
98. We stress seriatim what is thus emphasized in the holding:
1. The serviceman's proper absence from the base.
2. The crime's commission away from the base.
3. Its commission at a place not under military control.
4. Its commission within our territorial limits and not in an occupied
zone of a foreign country.
5. Its commission in peacetime and its being unrelated to authority
stemming from the war power.
6. The absence of any connection between the defendant's military duties and the crime.
7. The victim's not being engaged in the performance of any duty relating to the military.
8. The presence and availability of a civilian court in which the case can
be prosecuted.
9. The absence of any flouting of military authority.
10. The absence of any threat to a military post.
11. The absence of any violation of military property. One might add
still
another factor implicit in the others.
12. The offense being among those traditionally prosecuted in civilian
courts.
Relford,401 U.S. at 362-63. The remaining nine are general considerations in measuring service connection:
(a) The essential and obvious interest of the military in the security and
persons and of property on the military enclave. . . . (b) The responsibility
of the military commander for maintenance of order. See Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v.McElroy, 367 U.S. 836 (1961) .... (c) The impact and adverse effect that a crime committed against a person or property
on a military base, thus violating the base's very security, has upon morale,
discipline, reputation and integrity of the base itself, upon its personnel and
upon the military operation and the military mission. (d) The conviction
that Art. I, § 8, cl. 14, vesting in the Congress the power "To make Rules for
the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces," means, in
appropriate areas beyond the purely military offense, more than the mere
power to arrest a serviceman offender and turn him over to the civil authorities. The term "Regulation": itself implies, for those appropriate cases the
power to try and punish. (e) The distinct possibility that civil courts, particularly nonfederal courts, will have less than complete interest, concern, and
capacity for all the cases that vindicate the military's disciplinary authority
within its own community. (f)The very positive implication in O'Callahan
itself, arising from its emphasis on the absence of service connected elements
there, that the presence of factors such as geographical and military relationships have important contrary significance. (g) The recognition in
O'Callahanthat, historically, a crime against the person of one associated
with the post was subject even to the General Article. . . (h) The misreading and undue restriction of O'Callahanif it were interpreted as confining
the court-martial to the purely military offenses that have no counterpart in
nonmilitary criminal law. (i) Our inability appropriately and meaningfully
to draw any line between a post's strictly military area and its nonmilitary
areas, or between a serviceman-defendant's on-duty and off-duty activities
and hours on the post.
Belford,401 U.S. at 367-69 (footnote omitted).
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jurisdiction existed due to the nonexistence of factors 1, 2, 3, 7,
and 10. 99 However, Reford added the basis for two additional
areas that would allow military courts the chance to have jurisdiction in the future. The first areas of the "service connection" to be
broadened were elements A, B, C, and E of the nine additional
considerations. Just three years later the Supreme Court was to
note in Schlesinger v. Councilman:00
[The issue of service connection] turns on major part on gauging the impact of an offense on military discipline and effectiveness, on determining whether the military interest in
deterring the offense is distinct from and greater than that of
civilian society, and on whether the distinct military interest
can be vindicated adequately in civilian courts. These are matters of judgment that often will turn on the precise set of facts
in which the offense has occurred. See Relford v. U.S. Disciplinary Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971). More importantly,
they are matters as to which the expertise of military courts is
singularly relevant, and their judgments indispensable to inform any eventual review in Art. III courts.' 0'
Thus, jurisdiction could be expanded, because there is almost no
crime, committed by military personnel, that won't fall under at
least one of these criteria. 0 2 In addition, since the military court's
expertise in gauging the impact of these criteria is now "singularly
relevant," there is even more opportunity for allowing military
tribunals an expanding "service connection."
The second area that was to allow for an expansion of jurisdiction was element (H) of the nine additional considerations. In the
words of the court,
We recognize that any adhocapproach leaves outer boundaries
undetermined. O'Callahan marks an area, perhaps not the
limit, for the concern of the civil courts and where the military
may not enter. The case today marks an area, perhaps not the
limit, where the court-martial is appropriate and permissible.
What lies between is for decision at another time. 103
The Court was saying that future courts (by implication military
courts of review and COMA) would decide for themselves what
the extent of court-martial jurisdiction would be. Military appellate courts would soon show that if there was anything in the
world that they could not resist, it was temptation.
However, in the immediate years following Schlesinger there
99. Relford v. United States, 401 U.S. 355, 366 (1971).
100. 420 U.S. 738 (1975).

101. Id at 760.

102. United States v. Trottier, 9 M.J. 337 (C.M.A. 1980). A drug offense committed by a soldier who was at the time off-base, off-duty and out of uniform was found
to be service connected.
103. Relford v. United States, 401 U.S. 355 (1971).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol20/iss3/4

18

Spak: Military Justice: The Oxymoron of the 1980's
1984]

MILITAR Y JUSTICE

was a rather liberal COMA which sought to extend the maximum
amount of constitutional protection to service members, by limit4
ing court-martial jurisdiction. In United States v. Hedlund'
COMA overturned the earlier view that a victim's military status
would create the service connection. Prior to Hedlund, COMA
had consistently held that the military status of a victim would
yield service connection. 10 5
United States v. McCarthy'0 6 heralded another restriction of
military jurisdiction, this time in the area of drug offenses. Beginning in 1969, with United States v. Beeker'0 7 and extending to
1976, COMA had ruled that drugs posed a special danger to the
military community. Therefore, drug offenses, whether they occurred on or off-post, were service connected. In McCarthy, however, COMA ruled that not all drug offenses were automatically
service connected. This was because COMA realized that offpost/off-base drug offenses did not always pose special danger to
the military community.
In 1979, COMA further whittled away at subject matter jurisdiction over drug offenses. Borrowing from its rulings in United
States v. Hedlunda0 8 and United States v. McCarthy,0 9 COMA
handed down the opinion of UnitedStates v. Conn.' 0 In Conn, a
Military Police lieutenant openly used drugs in the presence of his
men, at an off-base apartment. COMA ruled that there was no
jurisdiction because no service connection existed. Unfortunately,
Conn marked the end of the era of restricting subject matter jurisdiction. A year later, the process of restricting subject matter jurisdiction would not only come to an end, but start to reverse
itself.
B.

1980 to Present

A giant step in the move to expand court-martial jurisdiction
was made in United States v. Trottier.I' Trottier dealt with drug
offenses. However, its perniciousness to the constitutional rights
of military personnel lay with the fact that it would later be used
to open up a wide range of other offenses and patterns to a yield2
ing of service connection." 1
104. 2 M.J. 11 (C.M.A. 1976).

105. See United States v. Everson, 19 C.M.A. 70, 41 C.M.R. 70 (1969) and cases
cited therein.
106. 2 M.J. 26 (C.M.A. 1976).

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

18 C.M.A. 563, 40 C.M.R. 275 (1969).
2 M.J. 11 (C.M.A. 1976).
2 M.J. 26 (C.M.A. 1976).
6 M.J. 351 (C.M.A. 1979).
9 M.J. 337 (C.M.A. 1980).
United States v. Lockwood, 15 M.J. I (C.M.A. 1983), off-base theft and for-
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Stating that drug abuse among service members was a serious
problem to military discipline COMA noted:
[W]hen we reflect on the broad scope of the war powers, the
realistic manner in which the Supreme Court has allowed Congress to exercise power over commerce, and the flexibility
which the Supreme Court intended for the concept of service
connection that, with the aid of experience, there could be a
suitable response to changing conditions that affect the military
society, we come to the conclusion that almost every involvement of service
personnel with the commerce in drugs is service
113
connected.
Thus, COMA created, for all practical purposes, automatic service
connection for all drug offenses. Jurisdiction even existed over
those military personnel who committed drug offenses off base
knowing that the drugs would not be introduced onto a military
installation. COMA had finally utilized those two special areas of
Retford v. Commandant 4 that were further emphasized in Schlesinger v. Councilman."5 By stating that military courts could assume jurisdiction over crimes that affect discipline, or adversely
affect military effectiveness, COMA had begun a process that
could eventually find an almost unlimited number of service
connections.
United States v. Shea16 offers a brilliant example of this extension. Shea was convicted of wrongful appropriation of another
service member's property and forgery of that person's name.
Both offenses were committed off base. The Navy-Marine Corps
Court of Military Review upheld the conviction saying:
[We conclude that forgeries and other property offenses where
the victim is a fellow service member may be sufficiently service-connected to support court-martial jurisdiction. While jurisdiction cannot be predicated solely upon the military status
of the victim of the offense, . . . the serious negative impact
that such property offenses indisputably have on morale, good
order, and discipline within a command and on an individual
servicemember's performance may establish the requisite service-connection."'7
In one full swoop, the Court of Military Review extended service
connection to another offense, and neutralized United States v
gery service connected; United States v. Masuck, 14 M.J. 1017 (A.C.M.R. 1982);
United States v. Shea 14 M.J. 882 (N.F.C.M.R. 1982), off-base by service member
ruled service connected; United States v. Fortenberry, 14 M.J. 505 (A.F.C.M.R. 1982).
113. 9 M.J. 337, 350 (C.M.A. 1980).
114. 401 U.S. 355, 367-69 (1971).
115. 420 U.S. 738, 760 (1975). See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
116. 14 M.J. 882 (N.F.C.M.R. 1982).
117. Id. at 884.
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Hedlund,' 18 by creating a criteria for service connection that could
easily be met.
A second example of the expanding service connection was offered by United States v. Lockwood 1 19 Therein, the accused was
charged with several offenses, including forgery of another service
member's signature on a promissory note that had been stolen
from an acceptance corporation. Even though the act occurred
off-base, COMA ruled that a service connection existed. In an
opinion of inscrutible sagacity the Court said:
While larceny from the Murphy Acceptance Corporation and
the forgery of Sage's signature to a promissory note took place
off base, Airman Sage was located on base and, although he
may not have been the primary victim of the forgery and theft,
S..

he was among the victims of these crimes. For one thing,

it was forseeable that as a result of Lockwood's actions, a demand would be made that Sage pay the forged promissory note
and if he declined to pay, a suit on the note would be instituted
against him. In that event, he would be exposed to the inconvenience-and possibly the expense--of defending himself
against the claim and would run the risk of an adverse decision
by the trier of fact in the civil action brought by the noteholder.
Furthermore, Sage would be exposed to the danger that nonpayment on the note executed in his name would be included in
credit reports without any explanation that he was under no
legal obligation to pay the note. Even though, as pointed out in
Uhlman, a person generally is not bound legally by a forgery if
his signature is on a note, check, or other legal document, we
are sure that, in view of the inconvenience and expense to
which is he subjected, a person whose signature has been
120
forged usually considers himself to be a victim of the crime.
First, Sage was a victim of a crime because of a hypothetical
fact pattern. No actual damage occurred because Sage did not
have to pay on the forged note, yet the possibility of damage to
Sage was enough for the court to support the finding of a service
connection. Henceforth, jurisdiction may be based on hypothetical fact patterns and/or inconvenience! The court also emphasized the Re/ford consideration of adverse effect of an off-base
crime on, "the 'morale, discipline, reputation, and integrity of the
base itself.'"121 The Court implicitly recognized that a military
22
organization had an interest in maintaining a good reputation.1
Subject matter jurisdiction was potentially enlarged because
under this vague criteria, virtually any crime committed by a serv118. 2 M.J. 11 (C.M.A. 1976).

119. 15 M.J. 1 (C.M.A. 1983).

120. Id. at 9.
121. United States v. Lockwood, 15 M.J. 1, 10 (C.M.A. 1983).

122. Id.
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ice member might now be found to effect a military installation's
"good reputation." The elements of Re/ford will undoubtedly allow an increasing number of assertions of service connections.
C

Subject Matter Jurisdiction: UnlimitedJurisdictionalReach
of the Devil'sArticles

23
Articles 133 and 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 1
sometimes referred to as the Devil's Articles, offer potentially unlimited subject matter jurisdiction over military personnel. These
, 24
articles were declared to be constitutional in Parker v. Levv 1
Levy was tried and convicted by court-martial for uttering "disloyal statements" such as the following:
The United States is wrong in being involved in the Viet Nam
War. I would refuse to go to Viet Nam if ordered to do so. I
don't see why any colored soldier would go to Viet Nam: They
should refuse to go to Viet Nam and if sent should refuse to
fight because they are discriminated against and denied their
freedom in the United States, and they are sacrificed and discriminated against in Viet Nam by being given all the hazardous duty and they are suffering the majority of casualties. If I
were a colored soldier I would refuse to go to Viet Nam and if I
were a colored soldier and were sent I would refuse to fight.
Special Forces personnel are liars and thieves and
125 killers of
peasants and murderers of women and children.
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Levy. The Court
said that these articles were not unconstitutionally vague. Rather,
they were proper requirements that the military could make of its
members. "This Court has long recognized that the military is, by
necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian life. We
have also recognized that the military has, again by necessity, de1 26
veloped laws and traditions of its own during its long history."
The Devil Articles offer yet another imploring plea to limit subject matter jurisdiction. As Justice Douglas noted in O'Callahanv.
Parker 27 "[art. 134] has been called 'a catch all' that 'incorporates
almost every federal penal statute into the Uniform Code.' "128

123. 10 U.S.C. §§ 133-34 (1956). Any commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be
punished as a court-martial may direct. 10 U.S.C. § 933 (1956); See infra note 127
and accompanying text.
124. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
125. Id. at 735.
126. Id.
127. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 273 (1969).
128. Id. Article 134 provides:
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, ..
all disorders and
neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all
conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and
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O'Callahan v. Parker required a service connection to exist
before court-martial jurisdiction could apply. United States v.
Trottier 29 began a movement to bastardize this requirement to the
point that anything that could possibly adversely effect a military
base was found to meet the service connection requirement. In
United States v. Lockwood,130 COMA ruled that an off-base larceny was service connected because Article 134 allowed for the
prosecution of anyone who adversely affects the good name of the
military establishment.
By prohibiting in Article 134 of the Uniform Code, 10 U.S.C.
§ 934, "all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the
armed forces," Congress also has acknowledged the importance
of maintaining the good name of the military establishment.
Even though Lockwood's forgery and theft occurred off-base,
they nonetheless had an adverse effect on the general reputa31
tion of Sheppard Air Force Base and those assigned there.'
There is no offense that is committed by a member of the armed
forces that could not eventually be found to be service connected
using the preposterously overbroad criteria of Articles 133 and
134. Therefore, Articles 133 and 134 offer another important reason to limit jurisdiction.
III.

PROCEDURAL MILITARY JUSTICE

An additional reason to restrict court-martial jurisdiction is
found in the very nature of procedural military justice. Although
not all aspects of military criminal procedure are narrower than
their civilian counterpart, 132 on balance, Military Criminal Proceof milidure is so ineffective in protecting the constitutional rights 33
tary personnel, that it passes the point of being obscene.
None of the travesties of justice perpetrated under the UCMJ is
really very surprising, for military law has always been and
offenses not capital, of which persons subject to this chapter ... may be
guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general, special, or summary courtmartial, according to the nature and degree of the offense, and shall be punished at the discretion of that court.
10 U.S.C. § 934 (1956) (citations omitted).
129. 9 M.J. 337 (C.M.A. 1980).
130. 15 M.J. 1 (C.M.A. 1983).
131. Id. at 9.
132. The Supreme Court in Goda v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 681 (1973), observed
that the military's pretrial investigation procedures furnished an accused with more
protection than was available to a civilian in the indictment process. In 1980, the
military adopted, with very few exceptions, the Federal Rules of Evidence. See 8
M.J. LXVIII. See generally S. SALTZBURG, L. SCHINASI & D. SCHLETER, MILITARY
RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL (1981).
133. See generally L. WEST, THEY CALL IT JUSTICE COMMAND INFLUENCE AND

THE COURTS-MARTIAL SYSTEM (1977). See generally R. SHERRILL, MILITARY JUSTICE Is

To JUSTICE

As MILITARY MUSIC Is To Music (1971).
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continues to be primarily an instrument of discipline not justice .... A civilian trial, in other words, is held in an atmosphere conducive to the protection of individual rights, while a
military trial is marked
by the age-old manifest destiny of re34
tributive justice. 1
There are three levels of trial courts-martial-Summary, Special,
and General. 135 The lowest level of trial courts-martial is the
Summary. 13 6 The injustice and potential for abuse in this court is
apparent ab initio. The accusing officer is allowed to act as the
convening authority of a Summary Court-Martial.137 Thus, the officer preferring charges, decides on who will determine guilt or
innocence. If the accusing officer is biased, he is supposed to
hand the matter over to a superior authority who will act as the
convening authority; 138 however, there is nothing to prevent an
immoral officer from hand picking a presiding officer, who will
surely find the accused guilty as charged. "[T]he fact that the convening authority or the Summary Court officer is the accuser in a
case does not invalidate the trial."'139 The injustice of this court is
further exemplified by the fact that this form of military trial is
generally held without the presence of counsel 40 or a professional
jurist.' 4 ' In fact, there is no requirement that the presiding officer
even be an attorney. The nature of the Summary Courts-Martial
142
System was described in Henry v. Mddendor
The presiding officer acts as judge, fact finder, prosecutor, and
defense counsel. . . . The maximum sentences which may be
imposed by summary courts-martial are: one months confinement at hard labor, 45 days hard labor without confinement;
two months restrictions to specified limits; reduction to the lowest enlisted
pay grade; and forfeiture of two-thirds pay for one
14 3
month.

Lest anyone consider vile, the idea of a serviceman being possibly sentenced to forty-five days at hard labor and reduced to the
lowest pay grade by a presiding officer hand picked by the convening authority, defenders of the system say that there is no need
to worry. These "defenders" point out that a fair trial is guaranteed by the following two postulates: First, Article 37 of the Uni134. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 266 (1969).
135. 10 U.S.C. § 816 (1956).
136. 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1956).
137. United States Manual for Courts-Martial 5(c) (rev. ed. 1969).
138. Id
139. Id.
140. Henry v. Middendorf, 425 U.S. 25, 34 (1976). There is no constitutional right
to independent counsel because a Summary Court Martial is not a criminal
prosecution.
141. Id at 29.
142. 425 U.S. 25 (1976).
143. Id. at 32-33.
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form Code of Military Justice 44 has officially outlawed command
influence. The convening officer is prohibited from "coercing" by
"any unauthorized means" the actions and judgments of the
court-martial in reaching its decision. 45 Second, as even the
Supreme Court has noted, fair trials are guaranteed by section 79
of the Manual of Courts-Martial:
The function of the presiding officer is quite different from that
of any participant in a civilian trial. He is guided by the admonition in section 79 of the MCM that "[t]he function of a summary court-martial is to exercise justice promptly . .. [tihe
summary court will [also] thoroughly and impartially inquire
into both sides of the matter and will assure that the the interests of both46 the government and the accused are
safeguarded." 1
The preceeding two safeguards look and sound effective. However, with a bit of scrutiny these arguments get tripped up like a
phonograph needle tracking the grooves of a warped record.
Article 37 of the UCMJ, and section 79 of the MCM may attempt to outlaw coercion and ensure impartiality, but, there are
still ways that a commander can subtley influence the outcome of
a trial. The presiding officer always knows that he may be passed
up for promotion, receive an unfavorable evaluation, or lose an
important friendship if his verdict displeases the convening authority. Nothing need be done at the time of the trial, but the
officer understands just the same. 147 In addition, since the accusing officer picks the presiding officer by name, he does not have to
say anything to ensure a conviction. He will just pick an officer
who will not disappoint him.
In addition to the above, another safeguard that is often mentioned is that an enlisted man can refuse a summary court-martial.'4 8 If an enlisted person refuses a summary court-martial, the
144. 10 U.S.C. § 837 (1956).
145. See 10 U.S.C. § 838 (1956).
146. Henry v. Middendorf, 425 U.S. 25, 41 (1976).
147. United States v. Littrice, 3 C.M.A. 487, 13 C.M.R. 43 (1953) (Ruled command influence and conviction of the accused overturned after the convening authority made several references to the efficiency rating of the court members in pretrial
conference). United States v. Hawthorn, 7 C.M.A. 893, 22 C.M.R. 83 (1956) (Ruled
command influence and conviction of accused overturned, after commanding general, not the convening authority, made it known to all officers and court members of
his desire for a conviction in all similar situations; his comments were made at a time
before arrest and trial through a policy directive) United States v. Navarre, 5 C.M.A.
32, 17 C.M.R. 32 (1954). However, conviction of accused upheld, after comments by
convening authority ruled innocous and innocent. Conviction even upheld through
evidence commanding officer lectured court members on another officer who had
given low efficiency report rating to a member of his command for his performance as
a member of a court-martial.
148. 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1956).
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alternative is a special or general court-martial.149 These expose
the accused to potentially harsher penalites. Thus, there is considerable "bitter," that goes along with the "better" court!
The final problem with the summary court-martial has to do
with its application. Only enlisted persons, not officers, are subject to trial by summary court-martial. 15 0 Upon what meat do
these officers feed that they have grown so great? Perhaps the
writers of the Uniform Code of Military Justice knew that the
summary courts-martial system is blatantly unfair, and wished to
save officers the ignominy of dealing with this system. Whatever
the reason, it is clear that this discrepancy raises serious moral, if
not equal protection issues, under the law.
Special courts-martial 51 are the intermediate level trial courts;
it may consist of any number of members, but it may contain no
less than three. These courts are convened by a higher level com52
mand than one needed to convene a summary court-martial.
These proceedings are truly adversarial in nature with separate
counsel for both sides, a military judge and a court reporter being
present. In this proceeding "court members" serve basically as
would a jury. The maximum punishment authorized to be dispensed by this court is a bad conduct discharge, six month's incarceration and/or forfeitures of two-thirds pay per month for six
months. 153

General courts-martial are the highest level of the military trial
courts. As with special courts-martial, general courts-martial contain separate counsel for both sides, a military judge and a court
reporter. However, unlike special courts-martial, general courtsmartial can only be convened by high level commanders and they
1 54
must consist of a military judge and at least five court members.
The maximum possible
punishment that can be authorized by
55
such a court is death.
These second and third levels of courts-martial will be analyzed
together. Except for a few minor differences, 56 they are practically identical for procedural purposes.
The general and special courts-martial give the apearance of being fair adjudicators of guilt and innocence. Unfortunately, this
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id Another alternative, in theory, would be a dropping of charge.

Id.
10
10
10
10

U.S.C. § 816 (1956).
U.S.C. § 823 (1956).
U.S.C. § 819 (1956). Manual for Courts-Martial § 127(c)(6) (1956).
U.S.C. § 816 (1956).
155. 10 U.S.C. § 818 (1956).
156. 10 U.S.C. § 816, 819 (1956). Manual For Courts-Martial § 127(c)(6) (1956).
The minimum number of court members and the maximum sentence that can be
handed down.
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fairness is only cosmetic since both courts-martial systems are vulnerable to command influence. In fact, command influence can
be a threat even before an accused reaches the courtroom of either
of these two systems. It is the commander who decides whether a
service member should be prosecuted. If a commander likes a
particular serviceman, in many cases there is nothing to prevent
him from not preferring charges. Alternatively, if a commander
dislikes a particular service member, there is nothing to prevent
charges from being preferred.
Once a commander decides to prefer charges, it is now another
commander's will which carries the great weight: the convening
authority. For it is the convening authority who is given wide latitude to decide which court-martial will try the accused. 157 Therefore, it is submitted that there is command influence at this point
in the trial process, because the convening authority indirectly
controls sentencing. Since it is he who determines which courtmartial will try the accused, it is the convening authority who decides, in a real and substantial manner, what the maximum punishment will be.
Command influence is not isolated to the court-martial selection process. It is the convening authority who also decides by
name, who will serve as court members. It is they who determine
guilt or innocence, 158 and assuming conviction, impose the sentence. As previously mentioned, the finding of guilt or innocence
can be determined as much by the members chosen to adjudicate
guilt or innocence, as by the actual guilt or innocence of the
59
accused. 1
Defenders of the system are quick to point out that there is a
possible safeguard built into the general and special courts-martial procedure to prevent this type of abuse. A service member
may, at his own request, have one-third of the members of the
court comprised of enlisted men.160 In fact, this "safeguard" affords very little protection from a corrupt convening authority.
First of all, there is no mandatory requirement that one-third of
the court be comprised of enlisted persons; the convening authority can cite "military exigencies" and refuse the accused's request. 16 1 Secondly, even if the "one third" request is granted, a
fair selection is not assured. There is nothing in the Uniform
Code of Military Justice to prevent the convening authority from
157. Manual for Courts-Martial 33(h) (rev. ed. 1969).
158. 10 U.S.C. § 825(2) (1956).
159. L. WEST, THEY CALL IT JUSTICE: COMMAND INFLUENCE
MARTIAL SYSTEM 7-9 (1977).
160. 10 U.S.C. § 825(c)(1) (1956).
161. Id.
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appointing the general's pastry chef or chauffeur. Third, even assuming a fair selection, it should be noted that a military judicial
finding of guilt requires a vote of guilty by only two-thirds of the
court.1 62 Finally, a moral, if not equal protection problem, arises
when officers are tried by courts-martial, since officers63cannot be
tried with enlisted members as members of the court.'
IV.

ALTERNATIVES TO OUR PRESENT MILITARY JUSTICE
SYSTEM

The Military tribunals must be abolished, and will be. They
are a survival of medieval prejudices. All citizens must be
equal before the law. The danger of allowing one cast to consider itself separate from the rest of the nation and above common law was vividly exemplified by today's monsterous
decision. 64
The bizarre reality of justice in the military has been demonstrated. What solution can remedy the myriad of abuses that
plague the system?
Some advocate that we do nothing. They view a broad military
jurisdictional reach as the only way to ensure a disciplined military. 165 Others maintain that we abandon our long-outmoded
concept of military justice and shrink military jurisdiction to cover
only those crimes that are unique to the military (e.g., AWOL,
166
Detention).
Almost every (truly free) democracy in the world (except the
United States of America) has greatly enlarged civilian control
over their respective military justice systems.167 The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and France have, for all practical pur162. 10 U.S.C. § 852(a)(1), (b)(10, (b)(3) (1956). Except no person may be convicted of an offense for which the death penalty is mandatory unless the vote is
unanimous.
163. 10 U.S.C. § 825(d)(1) (1956). This section reads, "When it can be avoided, no
member of the armed forces may be tried by any member which is junior to him in
rank or grade." There is almost no case when it cannot be avoided.
164. Statement of Jean Juares, socialist leader of France, spoken after the second
court-martial reaffirmed the conviction of Captain Alfred Dreyfus at Rennes, France,
1889. See, W. HARDING, DREYFUS: THE PRISONER OF DEVILS ISLAND 328-29
(1899).
165. See generaly Hunt, TrimmingMilitaryJurisdiction: An UnrealisticSolution to
Reforming Military Justice, 63 CRIM. L.C and P.S. 23 (1972). The author sees the
military as a system predicated on law and order, to which discipline is the only way
to preserve law and order, and expanded jurisdiction being the only way to preserve
discipline. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the "separateness" of the
military justice system and the importance of maintaining discipline. See e.g., Brown
v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354 (1980).
166. For an analysis of how this system would work, see infra note 172 and accompanying text.
167. L. WEST, THEY CALL IT JUSTICE; COMMAND INFLUENCE AND THE COURTSMARTIAL SYSTEM 284 (1977).
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poses, abolished their court-martial systems. Both countries now
handle military criminal justice matters through their civilian ju-

diciaries.' 68 In order to give a better understanding of how these
two approaches work, a brief description of both military criminal
justice systems will be considered.
On January 1, 1966 Jean Jaures' diatribe of indignation came
very close to becoming a reality in France. 169 On that date, a new
"French Code of Military Justice"170 became effective. It created
enormous changes in military justice procedure and jurisdiction.
The French realized that military tribunals do serve a valuable
function. Therefore, they felt the best way to cure the abuse in the
system was not to abolish the system, as Jaures advocated, but
rather to limit its jurisdiction. 171 The French Code states that during peacetime and within the territory of France, the permanent
judicial district courts 172 will exercise jurisdiction over members
173
of the armed forces who committed purely military offenses.
These courts also exercise jurisdiction over any military personnel
within a military establishment
who commit any criminal offense
74
service.1
military
to
or incident
The French do not stand alone at the vanguard of the movement to give military personnel the same constitutional rights enjoyed by their civilian counterparts. FRG gave its military

168. Id at 284.
169. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
170. Law No. 65-542, 8 Jul. 1965, as amended by Law No. 66-1038, 30 Dec. 1966,
Code de Justice Militarie, Petits Codes Dalloz (1967-1968) [hereinafter cited as CJM].
171. See generally The New French Code of Military Justice, 44 MIL. L. REv. 71
(1969).
172. The permanent judicial district court consists of five members--two civilian
magistrates (the president of the court and his assistant) belonging to the Military
Justice Corps, and three military judges. CJM art. 7.
173. Title II, Book III, CJM, lists the military offenses recognized. Chapter I
is concerned with the avoidance of military obligations such as failure to
abide by enlistment or conscription laws, the several forms of desertion and
unauthorized absences, encouraging or concealing deserters and malingering. Chapter 2 deals with offenses against honor or military duties. Listed
therein are the offenses of capitulation, treason, military conspiracy, pillage,
destruction of military property, misappropriation of military property or
funds, uniform violations, offenses against the flag of the armed forces, and
inciting acts against military duties or discipline. In Chapter 3 are set forth
infractions against discipline. These offenses consist of insubordination
(military revolt, rebellion, disobedience, illegal acts directed toward superiors, assault, insults, threats and refusal by a military commander to follow
orders) and abuse of authority (illegal acts against subordinates, abuse of
military requisitions and maintaining an illegal or repressive system of military justice). Chapter 4 concerns itself with military offenses in violation of
standing or general orders including misbehavior before the enemy offenses
by and against sentinels or lookouts and improper hazarding of a vessel or
airplane.
Comment, The New French Code ofMilitary Justice,44 MIL. L. REv.71, 85 (1969).
174. CJ.M. art. 56.
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personnel even more constitution protections, and the FRG did
175
this ten years before the French.
As already mentioned, criminal punishment of soldiers of the
Bundeswehr [Forces of the FRG] for violation of the German
criminal law is at present exclusively a matter of civil courts,
irrelevant of the fact that these offenses may have been committed on duty or otherwise are of a typically military nature.
With the above mentioned exceptions [German forces stationed
in a foreign country and German forces embarked on naval
units] military
courts are provided only in a case of armed
76
conflict. 1

These two systems illustrate that there are viable alternatives to
our present military justice system. Both France and Germany
offer a successful history of protecting the rights of military personnel, while at the same time not adding to the problem of main-

taining discipline in the military.
CONCLUSION

A disquieting and steady move toward expanding court-martial
jurisdiction has occurred during the past three years. There is no

evidence to show that this expansion will stop, or even slow down
in the immediate future. In fact, there is every reason to believe
that this expansion will continue unabated. 177 Defenders of the

system state that the military is a constitutionally mandated distinct community, separate from civilian society.' 78 They go on to
say that this "law and order society" is built on a foundation of
discipline, which in turn is founded upon broad military
179
jurisdiction.
The author concludes that military jurisdiction should be re175. See generally Comment, The Administration of Justice Within the Armed
Forces of the German FederalRepublic 7 MIL. L. REv. 1 (1960).
176. Id. at 5.
177. The current Chief Judge, Robinson 0. Everett, has given every indication
that he favors widening military jurisdiction. He has repeatedly expressed trust in the
ability of the military justice system to protect the constitutional rights of service
members. See, e.g., Everett, Some Comments On the Civilization ofMilitary Justice,
ARMY LAW, Sept. 1980, at 1. Chief Judge Robinson 0. Everett and Associate Judge
Cook also spoke before the House Armed Services Committee in favor of increasing
personal jurisdiction over military personnel. Amendments to Articles 2 and 36, Uniform Code of Military Justice: Hearings on § 428. Before the military personnel subcomm. of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). It
should be noted that at the committee hearing Chief Judge Everett was a professor of
law at Duke University and spoke in his capacity as chairman of the A.B.A. Committee on Military Law.
178. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744 (1974); Bums v.
Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953).
179. Schlueter, Court-MartialJurisdiction: An Expansion of the Least Possible
Power 73 J. CriM. L. 74, 94 (1982).
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stricted to purely military offenses, 80 for four major reasons:
First, military discipline does not require a broad military justice system that ravages the constitutional rights of military personnel. This contention is supported by the fact that the Federal
Republic of Germany has not even provided for court-martial jurisdiction over any crimes committed by military personnel, and
that France has limited military jurisdiction to "purely military
offenses."'"" Neither country has seen a need to change their civilian systems.
Second, military jurisdiction attaches against service members
fraudently induced into joining. 18 2 This results in destruction of
their constitutional rights, and subjects them to the capriciousness
83
of military law, without considering the actions of the recruiter.
Third, military justice and specifically, military procedural law
are inately unfair. 184 Therefore, we should welcome any opportunity of diminishing military jurisdiction.
Finally, because of the inate unfairness of military law, courtmartial jurisdiction should not attach over offenses committed off
base that have no real connection to the military establishment.
In this regard, there can be no justification for the elimination of
the constitutional rights of military personnel by asserting military
jurisdiction where there is no harm for the military to vindicate.
Unfortunately, heretofor, the sphere of ideas in Congress, with
regard to military jurisdiction has been a conquered province, occupied by expansionist attitudes and assumptions. 8 5 The limitation of military jurisdiction is not impossible; all that it entails is
the edification of Congress.

180.
181.
182.
183.

See supra note 172.
Id
10 U.S.C. § 802(b)(c) (1956).
Id.

184. See generally L. WEST,THEY CALL IT JUSTICE: COMMAND INFLUENCE AND

THE COURTS-MARTIAL SYSTEM (1977). See generallyR. SHERILL, MILITARY JUSTICE
Is To JUSTICE As MILITARY MUSIC IS To MUSIC (1971).
185. S.REP. No. 96-197, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 121 (1979). The Senate Committee
supported an increase in personal jurisdiction, even in enlistments that involved recruiter fraud or misconduct. However, it was their hope that recruiter fraud and misconduct would cease to exist.
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